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against express liability, is nevertheless relieved from personal liability on the contract. Therefore, the court apparently has repudiated the doctrine of descriptio personae,
in favor of a rule which has seldom, if ever, been recognized by the courts. No authority has been cited by the
court to sustain this proposition, and only one case has been
found which even remotely seems to support this principle.
That is the case of Printup v. Trammel, 25 Ga. 240, where a
party signed a promissory note as "Daniel Printup, trustee
for Mtrs. Abbey Farrar," in which the court held: "A. trustee
is not liable out of his own estate, on a note given by him as
'trustee' and so expressed when the consideration of the
note enured exclusively to the cestui que trust." The
Georgia court argues briefly against the personal liability of
a trustee so contracting. However, the duty is upon the
trustee to prove that the consideration inured to the benefit of the trust estate, which was the difficulty of the defendant
in the principal case. The only case cited by the majority
opinion in the principal case, Taylor v. Davis, supra, is directly in support of the general rule.
What will be the effect of this decision? It is possible,
though highly improbable, that a later court may follow
this case in its apparent repudiation of the doctrine of
descriptio personae. With the increasing tendency of the
courts to give a remedy directly against the trust estate, or
rather, to extend the number of exceptions to the general
rule, will naturally come the relaxation of the rule of personal liability of trustee. See the article of Justice Brandeis
in 15 AM. L. REv. 449. But, should the same question arise
in this jurisdiction within the next few years, the probability is that the Court will then construe the statement in the
syllabus of this case to mean that it is but a statement of
the general rule. This, the writer believes, may well be
done, as shown above. We can only wait until the Court is
given an opportunity to decide upon this question again.

-CLAIR

SMITH.

FATHER'S CONSENT TO UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT OF INFANT
SON IN DANGEROUS OCCUPATION AS BAR TO RECOVERY IN Ac-
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DEATH.-Plaintiff sues to recover
damages for alleged wrongful death of his son, an infant
under the age of sixteen years, while the latter was employed by defendant in violation of §§72 and 73, ch. 15H,
W. VA. CODE, 1923. The employment was with the consent
of the plaintiff, sole beneficiary. Defendant had complied with
the provisions of the Workman's Compensation Act. Held,
father's consent is bar to recovery. Hammack v. Hope Natural Gas Company, 140 S. E. 1 (W. Va. 1927).
TION BY FATHER FOR SON'S

This decision is in accord with the other decisions in this
state and elsewhere. Dickinson v. Stuart Colliery Company,
71 W. Va. 325, 76 S.E. 654. The Dickin~son Case restricted
the application of the rule to those cases where, in the
language of the court, the unlawful employment consented
to by the father was the proximate cause of the injury. So
far as can be determined with any degree of accuracy, the
court by this language means, apparently, that the rule applies
to those cases where the act causing death or injury to the
child under the statutory age limit, would not have caused
death or injury to an employee of greater age; in other words,
where the act is of such a nature that it can reasonably be said
to be just such an act from which the infant is intended
to be guarded by the statute. See Swope v. Keystone Coal &
Coke Company, 78 W. Va. 517, 89 S. E. 284; L. R. A. 1917 A,
1128. See also the cases annotated under §72, ch. 15H, W. VA.
CODE, 1923. Just what constitutes consent, so as to bar a recovery, is often difficult to determine. King v. Floding, 18
Ga. App. 280, 89 S.E. 451, holds that consent may be inferred from the parent's knowledge of, or acquiescence in,
the unlawful employment. The employment of a minor in a
lawful business or occupation is not unlawful merely because of lack of knowledge or consent by the parent
or guardian, if the employment be otherwise lawful. Adkins
v. Hope Engineering & Supply Company, 81 W. Va. 449, 94
S. E. 506. If there is a serious and substantial conflict in the
evidence as to whether the father did in fact consent to the
employment, the question is for the jury to decide. Waldron
v. Garland Pocahontas Coal Company, 89 W. Va. 426, 109
S. E. 729 (approved in the principal case). It will be noted
that where the employment is unlawful neither employer nor
employee can claim the benefit of the Workman's Compensa-
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tion Act. See CODE, W. VA., 1923, ch. 15P, §9, and also Banner Morrigon v. Smith-Pocahontas Coal Company, 88 W. Va.
158, 106 S. E. 448; Barnett v. Coal & Coke RailwayCompany,
81 W. Va. 251, 94 S. E. 150; Mangus v. Proctor Eagle Coal
Company, 87 W. Va. 718, 105 S. E. 909. This is true even
where the employer is otherwise entitled to the benefits of
the statute. Suppose, however, that death of a minor employee is proximately caused by illegal employment (to use
the language of the West Virginia court), and the employer has not elected to comply with the provisions of the
Workman's Compensation Act, although the nature of his
business is such that failure to avail himself of the benefits
of the Act would ordinarily result in depriving him of the
common law defenses, as provided by §26, ch. 15P, CODE, W.
VA., 1923. In a suit by the father, sole beneficiary, or by an
administrator for his benefit, should the employer, defendant, be permitted to defend on the ground that the father's
consent to such unlawful employment bars him from recovering? The principal case and Swope v. Keystone Coal &
Coke Company, supra, speak of such defense as being, in
effect the defense of contributory negligence, although it
might well be argued that the term "consent to an unlawful
act resulting in injury" is more appropriate. However,
since the theory of our court is that the violation of §§72
and 73, ch. 15H, CODE, W. VA., 1923 is actionable or prima
facie negligence, it may be reasonably assumed that in this
state such defense is that of contributory negligence. Does,
then, the statute, ch. 15P, §26, CODE, W. VA., 1923, deprive
the employer of such defense? Since the employment, being
unlawful, is not within the scope of the statute, and the rights
and liabilities of both employer and employee are to be determined as at common law, Banner Morrison v. Smith-Pocahontas Coal Company, 9upra; Mangus v. Proctor Eagle Coal
Company, supra; also Barnett v. Coal & Coke Railway Company, supra, it is submitted that the employer has a good
defense. As authority to the effect that where an employer, engaged in both interstate and intrastate business, in the
absence of acceptance of the Compensation Act, is not deprived of his common law defenses (as the statute applies
to such employer only upon condition that he and his employees accept its provisions by filing with.the commissioner
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written acceptances approved by him) see Miller v. United
Fuel Gas Company, 88 W. Va. 82, 106 S. E. 419, and also
Smith v. United Fuel Gas Company, 91 W. Va. 52, 112 S. E.
205.
-HUGH R. WARDER.

COUNSEL FEES AND EXPENSES IN RESISTING PRELIMINARY
WRIT OF INJUNCTION CANNOT BE RECOVERED IN SUIT ON INJUNCTION BOND.-This is a proceeding by notice of motion
for judgment on an injunction bond. Several years ago, the
defendant in error, after applying unsuccessfully for an injunction against the plaintiff, applied to this court and was
granted such restraining order. The defendant in error
then gave a bond in the penalty of $10,000, conditioned to
well and truly pay all damages as should be incurred or
sustained by plaintiff on account of said injunction in case
it should be dissolved. The injunction was dissolved by the
circuit court, which ruling was later affirmed by this court.
In estimating the amount of damages recoverable in the
present case, this court held that counsel fees and expenses
in resisting the preliminary writ cannot be taken into account in a suit on the bond. State ex rel Meadow River Lumber Company v. Marguerite Coal Company et al., 104 W. Va.
324, 140 S. E. 49.
Our statute provides that an injunction shall not take
effect until bond be given in such penalty as the court shall
direct, conditioned to pay all costs as may be awarded
against the party obtaining the injunction, and also such
damages as shall be incurred or sustaineld by the person
enjoined in case the injunction be dissolved. W. VA. CODE,
Ch. 133, §10. This statute changes the common law rule
under which there could be no recovery of damages on issuance of injunction except in cases where the suit was without
probable cause, or was prosecuted through malice. Glen Jean,
L. L. and D. R. Company v. Kanawha, G, J. and E. R. Company, 47 W. Va. 725, 37 S. E. 978. In estimating damages
caused by the improper issuing of an injunction, only those
proximately resulting from the issuance of the injunction are
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